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Abstract: 
We present a case study of the market of drug dealing in the context of a drug producing country. A 
main characteristic of a drug producing country is that illegal drugs are more accessible and have 
dramatically lower prices in the street market compared to countries that do not produce drugs. We 
locate our study to the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia; the country with the largest production of 
cocaine in the world. We make use of two sources of primary information (i) direct interviews to drug 
dealers, and (ii) media analysis of the local newspaper. Our main finding is that individual dealers 
exchange drugs, without any incentives to integrate and take control of the distribution in the city. That 
is, the low prices of drugs reduce profit and deter dealers to fight for monopoly, leading to a 
decentralized market of multiple uni-personal firms who use no violence. 
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1. Introduction 
Drug dealing is a worldwide phenomenon that draws the attention of researchers from 
multiple disciplines. Theoretical and empirical studies on this illegal activity have been 
carried for the past decades and yet the problematic is still of critical relevance. Particularly, 
most of the research has focused on the way this phenomenon occurs in drug consuming 
countries. This has left aside the very main insights that can be obtained from countries 
that consume, but also produce illegal drugs. We consider it is essential that both sides of 
the spectrum are taken into account to gain a clear understanding of the incentives and the 
strategies used by the parts involved in the drug dealing business.  
In that direction, the aim of this article is to study drug dealing from the perspective of a 
drug producing country. For this, we carried a case study in the city of Bucaramanga, 
Colombia. This country is the main producer of cocaine in the world. Our research is based 
on direct interviews to local drug dealers who offered information about the way this market 
operates. In addition, we developed a media analysis, for a period of ten years, of the local 
newspaper, which presents the arrests to drug dealers that took place on a daily basis. 
Through this, we provide a description of the different types of participants involved in the 
drug dealing market and the specific opportunity structures they face. 
 
1.1 Framework and relation to the literature on drug dealing 
The existing literature on drug dealing has mostly focused on countries that consume, but 
do not produce narcotics (i.e. The U.S. or western Europe), and those countries where 
narcotics are both consumed and produced have not been taken into account in the drug 
dealing level1. In order to have a thorough discussion on the problematic of drug exchange, 
it is essential to integrate research in producing countries as well. We denote a drug 
producing country as one in which illegal drugs are produced with the aim of trafficking 
them outside of its national borders. We contribute to this research program by providing a 
                                                
1 The central approach to drug producing countries is the study of drug traffic and the war on drugs. See Garcés (2005) 
and Guáqueta (2005). 
  
description of the way individuals organize and sell drugs in the city of Bucaramanga. This 
is one of the five biggest cities in Colombia; the main producer of cocaine in the world. 
Drug dealing, as we consider it in this study, is the interaction between the supplier of 
illegal drugs, the dealer, and a buyer who acquires the product for personal use, the 
consumer. Exchanges occur in different forms and our study gives account of three general 
modalities of dealing: fixed, semi-fixed and mobile. Independently of the way dealer and 
consumers exchange, we frame our analysis within the theoretical considerations of 
rational choice. The economic approach to crime through the pioneering work by Becker 
(1968) sets the foundations to understand criminals as rational agents. A central premise of 
this analysis is that criminals have well defined interests that are described by an individual 
utility function, and their motivation is to maximize such utility. Individuals are assumed to 
participate in illegal activities because they find it optimal to break the law (Roemer 2001). 
Therefore, the decision of committing a crime depends on the expectations agents have 
about their utilities when exchanging drugs or employing their time and resources in a 
different activity. In summary, some people become criminals not because their basic 
motivation is different from that of other individuals, but because their benefits and costs 
are. The role of the State is then to deter agents from choosing crime, using the police 
force and the legal system to reduce their incentives. Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000) make a detailed revision of this framework's main contributions and 
theoretical discussions. 
Prohibition makes drug dealing different from other economic activities because the role of 
the State is to deter agents from entering and participating in the market of illegal drugs. 
The transaction becomes costly, in part because of the surveillance and potential arrests 
from the police, and also because of the punishments the legal system imposes upon 
arrested criminals. The negotiation, needs to be carried outside of the legal boundaries, 
and as a consequence, the dealer and the consumer develop their own system of rules; an 
extralegal normative to bring the agreements into completion. The description and 
understanding of this extralegal organization is what motivates our research. 
Following the works by Coase (1960), Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Williamson (1973, 
1983, 1991) our research describes the different types of dealing as efficient organizational 
  
responses to the interaction between prohibition and the demand for illegal drugs. In brief, 
we assume economic agents as fundamentally amoral. They ignore the rules in order to 
promote their interests and acquire personal advantages. In this perspective, individuals 
develop the organizations, practices and informal rules in the drug dealing market 
motivated by selfish considerations. Although the assumptions can be widely criticized, this 
approach allows us to acknowledge crime by its strategic logic, more than by its ethic and 
moral considerations. Thus, we do not attempt to make a contribution to the design or 
evaluation of the institutional framing, but to enrich the information, knowledge and 
understanding of a social problem: drug dealing. 
Drug dealing, or the distribution of drugs for consumption inside a country, has been 
studied in multiple scenarios. In terms of the exchange of illegal drugs, Reuter, MacCoun 
and Murphy (1990), Levitt and Venkatesh (2000), and Skott and Jepsen (2002) have 
shown cases where this criminal activity is sustained by high expected-benefits. This, as a 
result, leads to the use of violence in order to maintain control over the market and the 
territory. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) consider how organized gangs behave and deal with 
illegal drugs in the city of Chicago. Reuter, MacCoun and Murphy (1990), have studied the 
case of individual dealers instead of organized collective actions. Other interesting case is 
that considered in Frey (1997) where the local government in Switzerland takes control of 
the distribution of illegal drugs, in this case heroin, in order to regulate the market and the 
negative externalities it brings along. Independently of the parts involved, it is fundamental 
to distinguish that the exchange is separated from what is known as drug trafficking, where 
the buyer of the drug has the objective of reselling the narcotics to obtain monetary benefits 
out of it. 
Our work contributes to this literature, but particularly differs from the existing works by 
considering a case of drug dealing whose object of study is the market inside a drug 
producing country instead of a drug consuming one. The main characteristics of drug 
producing countries according to the United Nations World Drug Report (UNODC 2010), in 
particular countries in Latin America such as Colombia, is that the availability of drugs is 
greater. That is, drugs are easier to find than in non-producing countries, even drugs hat 
are only produced for domestic consumption (i.e. Colombia is the largest producer of 
  
cocaine in the world, and the objective is to sell this drug outside the country. Yet, 
marijuana is produced for domestic consumption). Linked to the above-mentioned is the 
fact that domestic prices of illegals drugs are dramatically lower than in countries were 
drugs are only consumed. These factors alone pose already a critical differentiation, given 
that it has been well studied that the incentives and motivation of the market of illegal drugs 
is that of the high revenues it involves.  
One can ask then, how does a market is organized when drugs are still illegal, but their 
availability is such that the price of the drugs and the profits associated to dealing are very 
low. Thus, the main question in our study is to understand how is the market of drug 
dealing organized for the case of the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia. As a consequence of 
our main objective, we also ask, what is the structure of incentives for the drug dealers in 
such a market? For this, we carried a set of interviews to local drug dealers in 
Bucaramanga. The main contribution of this work observes how drug dealing functions in a 
context were prices are low. The relevance of our work in the study of illegal drugs directly 
relates to the theoretical predictions that low prices result in lower levels of violence and 
criminal organization. 
 
1.2 Description of our approach and main results 
The first differentiation between drug trafficking and drug dealing is that the former takes 
place to supply the external demand, purchasers outside Colombia, while the latter 
supplies locals. The second difference is that in drug trafficking an intermediary sells 
narcotics to another intermediary in the supply chain. Therefore, the purchaser acquires 
illegal drugs to sell them again. Drug dealing, however, takes place when the intermediary 
in the supply chain is the final link and the purchaser uses the narcotics for personal 
consumption. Whereas traffickers exchange kilograms of drugs, dealers exchange grams. 
This provides two main considerations for our study. First, a dealer is an individual with 
control over a small portion of the drug dealing market, and no control of the drug trafficking 
market. Second, because the prices of illegal drugs outside Colombia are greater than 
  
inside the country, the levels of income between the dealer and the trafficker are notably 
different (UNODC 2010). 
To understand the specificities of drug dealing, we use two sources of primary information 
to sustain our research and study the behavior of the agents involved in the market. The 
fundamental source used to develop this article is a set of semi-structured interviews we 
carried out with drug dealers in the city of Bucaramanga. We interviewed dealers during a 
period of one year, meeting between one and two times with each dealer using a snowball 
sampling technique. A more detailed description is presented in the next section. These 
interviews give account of the perception dealers have about their job2. In order to 
complement the interviews, we used the information published in the only daily newspaper 
in Bucaramanga: Vanguardia Liberal. The journal publishes a daily criminal section. If a 
drug dealer has been captured by the police, this section of the newspaper presents data 
about the arrests of drug dealers, specifying the class of exchange they were involved in, 
and the drugs and weapons they had at the moment of the arrest. We examined this 
journal during the period between January 1994 and December 2004. 
As a result, we observe that the market of illegal drugs in the city of Bucaramanga is 
characterized by individual suppliers with no incentives to create more complex 
organizational structures, for this increases the probability of detection by the police while 
their profits do not increase as much, given the low prices of illegal drugs in a producing 
country compared to consuming countries. The difference in relative income between 
dealers and traffickers, also known as drug lords, has brought high levels of violence to the 
latter given the potential benefits it offers. In drug dealing, on the other hand, the supply 
side is composed by small-time dealers who exclude from their interaction any use of force 
or imposition. In relation to other dealers violence is excluded, at least in the city of 
Bucaramanga, due to the fact that potential losses of a violent encounter to defend a 
territory are greater than the potential benefits they can earn by dealing. In relation to the 
consumer, there is no violence because agreements are voluntary. Therefore, apart from 
                                                
2 There are no recordings or transcriptions of the interviews. The dealers who agreed to participate in them, felt their 
safety could be exposed, and did not allow us to register the conversations. 
  
the categorization of illegal, both the consumer and the dealer have incentives to 
participate in the exchange, making the interaction a victimless crime3. 
Nonetheless, a victimless crime that excludes violence is still a crime, and the parts 
involved face a potential cost by the punishments the State imposes to them. The State 
needs a formal institutional framing to deter the exchange since obedience to the law 
cannot be presupposed. In this context, the dealer and the consumer represent the side of 
illegality, and the police force is the representation of the law. Consequently, the police are 
defined as a strategic economic agent, whose choice plays a direct effect upon the payoffs 
of the other agents: dealers and consumers4. We describe the role of the police in the drug 
dealing exchange from the information provided by the dealers in the interviews. That is, 
our description of the legal side of the exchange is deliberately biased to the point of view 
of one agent, the dealer, who represents the main interest in our study. 
The case study can be characterized in three aspects: (i) we describe the system of 
incentives and the set of strategies for the dealer, the consumer and the police; (ii) we 
characterize the emerging structures of drug exchange as a set of transactions that can 
take place in either of three categories. The purely fixed exchange, where the client goes to 
the selling point to buy drugs. The semi-fixed, where both dealer and consumer are located 
in flexible meeting points and both attempt to coordinate to meet. Finally, the completely 
mobile, in which the dealer delivers the drugs at a meeting point set by the client; and (iii) 
we group the three classes of drugs available: marijuana, cocaine and crack, as different 
segments of the same market. For the case of the consumer, the three drugs are goods 
that respond to similar needs. For the dealer, they are a possibility to increase her income 
by winning economies of scope, if exchanging various classes of drugs simultaneously. 
The article is structured in five sections including this introduction. In section 2 we describe 
the methodology of our study. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present the way in which consumers, 
dealers and the police are organized, respectively. Each of these sections also includes a 
detailed description of their incentives and opportunity costs as informed by the dealers 
who participated in the interviews we carried out. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                
3 Crimes without victims do not generate a direct damage to the parts involved in them, as opposed to crimes against 
people (rape or murder) or crimes against property (theft or vandalism). 
4 We refer to ``the police'' as individuals, and not to the National Police of Colombia, as an institution. 
  
 
2. Case of study and methodology 
Bucaramanga is the capital of the department of Santander, located on the northeast side 
of Colombia (see Figure 1). The population of the city of Bucaramanga is 516,512 
inhabitants, according to the census of 2005 (DANE, 2005). It is the fifth largest city in 
Colombia. Its territorial dimension covers 165km2, which is subdivided into 17 comunas, or 
subareas. 
Figure 1: The city of Bucaramanga 
 
In the map of Colombia (left) Bucaramanga is located on the North-East. The political map of the 
city (right) divides Bucaramanga in 17 areas, each categorized by a specific indicator of 
socioeconomic stratification. 
To obtain information about the market of illegal drugs in Bucaramanga, we performed 
semi-structured interviews with 35 drug dealers. These interviews took place between the 
years 2005 and 20065. Dealers were recruited for the interviews using the snowball 
sampling techniques. Therefore, each dealer, once interviewed, was asked to suggest at 
least one other dealer to participate in the study. Although not every referenced dealer was 
willing to participate, this sampling technique allowed us to gain access to a population, 
which is normally hesitant to collaborate in studies such as ours (Eisenhardt 1989). In fact, 
                                                
5 Participants were interviewed in a location of their choice. Most of them chose public places as cafeterias, cafes, and the 
campuses of the universities in the city. They all reported to work in the city of Bucaramanga. According to their answers, 
9 were classified as dealers in the completely fixed type of exchange, 6 in the semi-fixed types and, the remaining 20 in 
the mobile type of exchanges. 
  
most participants expressed that if another dealer had not introduced us they would have 
not trusted to be part of our investigation. 
Interviews provide excellent access to the very particular characteristics of our sample, and 
explore their perceptions, behavior and individual incentives. They also supply higher levels 
of detail than surveys which contain concrete questions and pre-established answers. Each 
dealer was interviewed separately. The length of time and the face-to-face interaction of the 
interviews provided a more natural setting for the respondents6. In addition, we started 
every encounter by explaining the purpose of our study in order to generate an 
environment of trust and clarity. In our questions, we did not impose arbitrary categories of 
analysis, for this would have limited their answers (Fontana and Frey 1994). Each 
participant answered the same set of open questions; however, we allowed the interviewer 
to insist on some points when necessary, in order to suggest clarifications or to reveal 
unforeseen aspects. Our attempt was to unveil the structure and characteristics of the drug 
dealing interaction. For example, dealers were asked about the classes of drugs they 
exchanged, the way they entered into the business, whether they were independent 
dealers or part of any organization, and how did they perceive risk in their job given the 
work of the police. 
Our second source of information is the Vanguardia Liberal newspaper. This journal keeps 
a daily log of the drug dealers arrests in the city of Bucaramanga, the type of exchange 
they were part of, the classes and amounts of drugs found, and the weapons in their 
possession. We collected the data for the period between January 1994 and December 
20047. 
The information obtained both from the interviews and the journal shows that dealers in 
Bucaramanga exchange mainly three classes of drugs: crack, marijuana and cocaine. In 
terms of the narcotics found under possession of the dealers arrested, marijuana 
represents the highest among the total, 51%, followed by cocaine, 25%, and crack, 24%. 
                                                
6 On average the interviews lasted around one hour, and in some cases it was possible to contact one same person for 
two or three meetings. 
7 See the Annex for a detailed description of the available information. 
  
We exclude from our study other substances that are not representative to the exchange in 
the city, either because they are legal or not commercial8. 
In terms of weapons, the interviewed dealers reported that their revenues are not high 
enough to motivate the involvement of violence. Moreover, they stated that the price of a 
gun is much higher than what a dealer could earn over many weeks. This report is 
supported by the data on the arrested dealers. Only 12 people from the entire sample of 
arrested dealers had knives, and 17 had a fire gun with them. As it can be observed in 
Figure 2, a total 76% of the captured dealers did not have any sort of weapon nor money 
with them. In spite of the fact that some dealers had weapons under their possession at the 
moment of the arrest, we consider the data as an indicator of the low-level of conflict and 
violence in the drug dealing market. Furthermore, some of the respondents mentioned that 
they did not only work as dealers. This means that the possession of a gun could be due to 
the fact that they either were also delinquents or had legal permits to carry a gun. 
 
 
Figure 2: Possession of weapons and money 
 
The use of weapons such as knives or fire guns is not common between drug dealers. 76% of 
the arrested dealers had no weapons with them. 
                                                
8 The usage of synthetic drugs such as acids or amphetamines has not been generalized in the city. Other common drugs 
consumed, but with no commercial relevance, are magic mushrooms, the leafs, stems, flowers or seeds of the borrachero 
tree, where the scopolamine is obtained from, or beverages such as yagé. These less commercial drugs are generally 
consumed in groups on the country areas outside the city, and most of the times consumption takes place during a sort of 
spiritual ritual. Finally, there is glue, a legal substance socially perceived as the drug of the homeless. 
  
It is also interesting to highlight that the arrested dealers are predominantly young, 60% are 
under 37 years old. In Figure 3, it can be observed that 1% of the arrested dealers are 
under 18, 37% range between 18 and 27 years old, and 22% are between 28 and 37. The 
interviews confirmed this fact, explaining that in general, individuals enter into the drug 
dealing business at an early stage of their lives, when they have few possibilities for better 
work or study opportunities.  According to the interviews, although some dealers enter 
young, in most cases drug dealing is still the best option for many of them along the years. 
This can be supported by the fact that many (40%) are dealers above 37 years old, which 
do not categorize them as you, anymore, by crime standards. 
Figure 3: Age 
 
60% of the arrested dealers are under 37 years old. 
Up to this point, we have presented the general framework of our case of study and the 
theoretical and methodological approaches followed. In the next sections, we systematize 
the information through the categories of analysis common to economic theory: supply and 
demand. In other words, we define the market, its different segments, and the individual 
incentives that consumers, dealers and the police face. Aiming to understand, in detail, the 
cost-benefit relation that determines the characteristics of the interaction between a 
consumer and a dealer of illegal drugs in the city of Bucaramanga. 
 
3. The demand 
In this section we introduce the individuals that demand illegal drugs and the attributes they 
consider valuable in the transaction. Moreover, from the narcotics individuals consume, we 
  
can define different segments of the drug dealing market in the city of Bucaramanga. We 
carry out our analysis based upon the definitions of transaction costs in Coase (1960), 
which states that a dealer must find potential buyers and inform them about the intentions 
of exchanging, including the terms of the negotiation. Then, the exchange takes place and, 
in some cases, a retribution could be asked when the terms of the agreements are not 
observed. 
 
3.1 Consumers: Segments of the market 
We characterize the demand of illegal drugs based on the descriptions and considerations 
widely shared by drug dealers in Bucaramanga. We use this information to separate the 
market in three segments: consumers of crack, marijuana and cocaine. The categorization 
is made in terms of the economic wealth of the consumers, as perceived by the dealers. In 
other words, consumers are described in a range, locating crack users in the less wealthy 
extreme and cocaine users in the wealthier one, while the consumers of marijuana are 
present in every spectrum. These segments are not exclusive; the user of one class of drug 
may also use any of the other two. 
Crack, a derivative of cocaine, is a stimulant that boosts alertness and increases the 
activity of the central nervous system. Consumers of crack are individuals of scarce 
economic resources, principally beggars and homeless people. They are known as 
chirretes; a derogatory term derived from the street name of the drug: chirri. This drug is a 
powder and its effect is obtained by smoking it. In order to do so, chirretes mix crack with 
ashes since it is not flammable by itself. Given the strong toxic composition of the drug, 
chirretes exhibit deteriorated physical characteristics. They appear very thin and their facial 
outline is accentuated. The drug is mostly consumed on the streets, where the users spend 
their time, and its use is individual, so every consumer purchases her own. 
Marijuana, technically known as cannabis, is a depressant that causes a feeling of 
relaxation and happiness. Consumers of marijuana belong to all ranges of socio-economic 
stratification, given its affordable price and accessibility. The street name used to denote its 
consumers is Marijuaneros. The effect of the drug on the physical appearance of its users 
  
is much less dramatic than that of crack, although high levels of consumption might lead to 
weight and short memory loss. Marijuana is perceived as a recreational drug. Marijuaneros 
most commonly obtain the effect of this weed by smoking it. The drug is generally 
consumed in a variety of private places, such as houses or apartments, since its 
characteristic smell when burnt can draw the attention of the police. In contrast to crack, 
marijuana is generally used in groups; more than one person shares one cigarette of 
marijuana. 
The third segment refers to cocaine users. Cocaine is a nervous system stimulant, derived 
as an alkaloid from the coca leaf. The consumers of cocaine tend to have higher incomes 
than those who consume only marijuana or crack. In terms of prices, one gram of cocaine 
costs five to seven times more than one gram of crack, in Bucaramanga. Cocaine dealers 
proudly informed that within their clients were medical doctors, businessmen, and lawyers, 
among others. Even though it is not possible to state that all the consumers of cocaine 
follow these characteristics, its high price tends to exclude frequent consumption by 
individuals with low income. The street name for cocaine is perico and its consumers are 
denoted as periqueros. Dissimilar to the names chirrete or marijuanero, periquero is not 
derogatory, given that cocaine is a status symbol among consumers. Cocaine is a white 
powder, and its effect is commonly obtained by inhaling it. Its frequent use has similar 
physical consequences of crack. Given that it is inhaled instead of smoked, the 
consumption of cocaine can be done almost anywhere in a discrete manner. Dealers 
consider cocaine a drug used both individually and in shared groups. 
 
3.2 How to get the drugs? 
The main characteristic that differentiates drug dealing from other types of drug exchange 
is manifested on the side of the demand. The buyer purchases the drug for personal 
consumption and not because she is interested in selling the substance to make money. 
Therefore, the choice of the client is between consuming drugs and not doing so. If 
consumption is preferred, she must look for a dealer and negotiate the terms of the 
transaction, as shown by Coase (1960). Although the levels of consumption are different 
  
between drug users, there are two characteristics that relate to any consumer in the drug 
dealing interaction. First, the demand of drugs is inelastic as a result of the addiction it 
generates on drug users (see Becker and Murphy, 1988). Second, independent of the class 
of drugs consumed and the income of the consumer, the motivation is to obtain drugs of 
higher quality for a lower price.  
Quality, as the key referent of the transaction for the consumer, involves more than the 
mere pureness of the drugs purchased. It is clear that the client prefers to buy from a 
dealer who offers higher levels of pureness. Nevertheless, quality includes the process of 
search and negotiation, as well as the effect that the drug produces when consumed. In 
other words, the evaluation that the consumer makes on the product depends on the 
treatment she receives, the safety of the transaction, the reputation of the dealer, and 
certainly, the amount, pureness and price of the drugs. 
Consider the search process. A common and effective solution to aid the search process in 
most economic activities is advertisement. Suppliers use media as a tool to facilitate the 
investigation consumers undergo to find their products. However, when the economic 
activity is illegal, this possibility is no longer available. Suppliers, then, cannot go beyond 
the word-of-mouth publicity to announce and promote their products.  
Some dealers station themselves in areas of low socio-economic stratification or in the 
center of the city. These neighborhoods are generally areas of criminal focalization, where 
poverty is mixed with delinquency and prostitution, among others. Such locations are 
known to be focal points to encounter drug dealers, thus simplifying the search. Following 
the same conventions of drug consumption are streets where the night-life takes place. 
Bars, pubs, discotheques, are grouped in specific areas of the city, which are identifiable to 
a consumer as potential dealing points. For drug dealers, the streets where the bars are 
located represent places where finding consumers is evident without using any explicit or 
previous communication between them. 
The choices of location, which depend on a specific physical place, are denoted in our 
study as fixed. The opposite extreme of fixed locations in either criminal or party areas is 
that of complete mobile dealing. Some other dealers separate themselves from a fixed 
  
location and are contacted by their clients through mobile communication. In such cases, 
the search process for a consumer is reduced to a phone call. Clients and dealers specify 
through a phone call the meeting place and time, the classes of drugs desired, as well as 
the quantity and price. Thus, not only the search, but also the negotiation occurs prior to 
the encounter.  
Apart from searching and purchasing the drugs, the client risks being punished while the 
illegal drugs are under her possession. In these terms, it is clear that quality goes beyond 
the pureness of the drugs purchased. It becomes necessary for the consumer to assess 
the safety of the transaction in terms of evading the police activity. There are also risks 
related to the other crimes that surround the areas of exchange; which are criminal areas. 
The client endangers herself of being robbed or attacked by other delinquents present in 
the neighborhood. Therefore, when a client finds a dealer and does not feel threatened of 
being captured nor hurt by external factors, the transaction takes place. 
The negotiation is simple, whether it transpires face-to-face or through a telephone call. In 
most cases, it does not involve any type of bargaining because both parts attempt to finish 
quickly in order to avoid drawing any attention to the exchange. Additionally, clients do not 
have a way to test the quality of the drugs purchased prior to actual consumption9. In case 
the consumer is cheated and the drugs are of lower quality than expected, her optimal 
response it to look for a new dealer. There are no mechanisms or legal support to make the 
previous dealer fulfill the agreements, and the exchange is worth such small monetary 
value that usually violence is not an option. In this sense, the result and control of the 
transaction is limited and commonly reduced in case of the consumer to staying alert of not 
being cheated by the supplier and, for either of them, to getting involved in a police 
operation and as a consequence arrested. 
As proposed, we can model the demand of illegal drugs in three categories: fixed, semi-
fixed and mobile exchange. In the first extreme, the client must go to a selling point chosen 
by the dealer in order to exchange. On the other extreme, it is the dealer who goes to a 
                                                
9 The interviewed dealers informed that in order to measure the quality of cocaine, it is necessary to use at least a gram of 
the powder, mixed with other chemical solutions. Crack is a residual component of cocaine, and thus it is by default a non 
pure drug, and marijuana could be mixed with other types of weed that make it difficult to assess its effect unless it is 
consumed. 
  
meeting place chosen by the client. It is possible to discuss product differentiation since 
dealers do not sell standardized products to homogeneous consumers. In this order of 
ideas, the choice of a dealer is based on the population with whom she wants to do 
business. 
 
4. The supply 
Drug dealers play the role of intermediaries along the chain of production and distribution of 
illegal drugs: buying and transforming the substances in order to sell them again. Although 
the dealers' motivation to partake in this criminal activity might vary from person to person, 
in general, we can state that they commit this illegal action in order to maximize their 
income (Becker, 1968). In order to do this, dealers choose which segment of the market 
they wish to serve, locate their business in it, and provide drugs to consumers. Based on 
the responses given by the dealers interviewed in our study, we observed that the different 
types of exchange are strategically paired in the sense that they need each other.  
As opposed to studies of drug dealing in cities of non-producing countries (Reuter, 
MacCoun and Murphy, 1990, Levitt, and Venkatesh, 2000, Skott and Jepsen, 2002, 
Venkatesh, 2006) dealers in the city of Bucaramanga do not attempt to run over their 
competitors and turn their business into a monopoly. This is not because illegal drugs have 
particularly different characteristics compared to a standard consumption good. As this 
section proposes, the reason for strategic complementarities is related to the fact that 
horizontal integration would imply becoming visible to the authorities, who seek to capture 
and punish the offenders. Visibility increases the probability of arrest and punishment for 
both the dealer and the consumer. Therefore, the trade off between the increased risk and 
income when controlling more segments of the market does not compensate the suppliers, 
mainly due to the low prices of drugs inside Colombia10. We say then that the market 
emerges as a configuration of multiple, non-focalized dealers who distribute the demand 
along different locations in the city and, as a consequence, reduce visibility. 
                                                
10 In Colombia, for decades, there has been a war between the different drug cartels and drug lords. Their aim is to 
control the market that supplies drugs to consuming countries, mainly the US and Western Europe. The war is motivated 
and supported by the great monetary benefits of drug traffic. This is not the case of drug dealing. 
  
 
4.1 The productive process 
Dealers also undergo a process of search, negotiation, exchange and follow-up in the 
productive process. We start by describing the acquisition of the drugs in order to sell them, 
the necessary agreements to access a segment of the market, the transformation process 
of the drugs, and the distribution to the final consumer. 
The production process of illegal drugs like crack, marijuana and cocaine is mainly 
agricultural. Specific plants11 are grown and used as input for the elaboration of the final 
product. Other organizations, commonly farmers and guerrilla or paramilitaries groups carry 
out the production of drugs in Colombia. Given the object of study in this article is drug 
dealing, we will not describe in detail the first stage of the process.  
The participation of the drug dealer in the production and distribution chain is limited to the 
purchase of the drugs from a higher intermediary when the substances are already set for 
consumption. Once acquired, dealers transform the purchased substances. This is 
commonly known as cutting the drug, and consists of increasing the amount of narcotics by 
reducing its pureness through the addition of other components. After the drugs have been 
cut, dealers pack them in small units for individual consumption, which facilitates storage 
and distribution.  
Like most other economic activities, the seller needs to find providers to access the 
products that they want to offer. In the case of illegal drugs, dealers purchase drugs from a 
higher intermediary in the supply chain. In Bucaramanga, a few providers control the entire 
distribution of drugs, which is normally the case in a city. To gain access to the supply, 
dealers must reach informal agreements with the higher intermediary. In most cases these 
transactions show two features. First, dealers purchase low quantities. Some of the 
interviews reported that at most one dealer purchases one kilogram of cocaine12. Second, 
payments are made immediately and in cash. These two features simplify the negotiations. 
Therefore, the only requirement to gain access to the transaction is that the dealer knows a 
                                                
11 Canabbis for marijuana and coca plant for cocaine and crack. 
12 This makes a clear difference with drug traffic, in which intermediaries exchange tens, hundreds and even thousands of 
kilograms. 
  
higher intermediary in advance. In terms of trust, she must not generate any suspicion of 
being an undercover police agent. If these simple requirements are met, the higher 
intermediary provides the dealer with illegal drugs. 
Dealers must make agreements not only to gain access to the supply, but also to determine 
a selling point. For the case of Bucaramanga (and many cities in Colombia), the multiple 
armed conflicts in rural and urban areas have lead different non-official armed groups to 
take control and regulate areas in the cities. Agreements to sell drugs are, therefore, made 
by the dealers with the armed groups controlling the area of potential distribution. Such 
groups can be urban cells of guerrilla or paramilitaries, common delinquency, or the police. 
According to the interviews, agreements are neither elaborate nor limiting. They only take 
place on few occasions and depend more on the control that other illegal organizations13 
have over the territory than on the effects of drug usage on the final consumer. This is due 
to the fact that local dealers, police agents, and leaders of organized crime, are constantly 
changing. Therefore it is impossible to make long-term arrangements. 
The second step of the process is the transformation of the drugs. Independent of the 
amount purchased, dealers cut the drugs. They decrease pureness through the addition of 
cheaper components reducing the average costs of production. The process of 
transformation starts from the initial links of the supply chain all the way to the final dealer. 
Something worth highlighting is that the components used to cut the drugs decrease in 
quality as it moves down the chain. For example, the higher intermediaries cut cocaine with 
components obtained out of the actual production process of cocaine. This causes an 
effect similar to a product of a higher level of pureness and will not significantly increase the 
damage to the users' health. As the pyramid goes wider from the top to the final distributor, 
the components used to cut the drugs are of any material as long as they are similar to the 
texture, shape and color of the drugs. In the case of cocaine and crack, dealers in the last 
link of the supply chain reported the use of chalk, flour, oatmeal, aspirins, bricks, dust, and 
amphetamines to cut the drugs. In the same way, some dealers mix marijuana with other 
weeds similar in appearance, to increase its volume and weight. 
                                                
13 Dealers reported that these organizations do not deal drugs inside the city. They are involved in bigger crimes as 
kidnapping or murder. 
  
Most consumers are aware of the quality reduction that drugs go through along the supply 
chain. Yet they do not have ways to measure the drugs prior to consumption. Thus, 
consumers rely on the reputation of the dealer as a sign of quality; the best option in this 
illegal context. However, such informal mechanisms are limited, given that both consumers 
and dealers constantly change. Dealers did not report the usage of any commercial 
trademark to label their products as a means of differentiation, even though this mechanism 
might serve as a signal of quality. 
The packing of the drugs is the last step in the process prior to distribution. Similar to all 
previous steps, packing is simple and does not require high investments. The type of 
packing depends on the physical characteristics of the drugs. Crack is sold in small plastic 
bags or wrapped in sheets of paper. Each unit weights one gram. Marijuana is a more 
complex substance to store since its volume is greater than crack. Dealers use 
compression devices that press the weed into rectangular blocks of approximately one 
kilogram. These blocks are then divided in smaller packs and wrapped with newspaper or 
notebook sheets. Dealers sell packs of approximately ten grams, and sometimes offer pre-
rolled cigarettes with marijuana inside: joints. One gram of cocaine is packed into short 
plastic straws, sealed on both ends. Cocaine can also be sold in small plastic bags. These 
ways of division and packing facilitate the storage and transportation of the drugs. 
 
4.2 The dealers: A house, the streets and the domiciliary 
Dealers specialize in specific segments of the market and offer different services to each. 
Each segment belongs to a point along an interval that goes from purely fixed exchanges to 
completely mobile. Even though the categorizations made are not explicit concepts 
expressed by the interviewed dealers, we build on them to facilitate the analysis. We 
categorize drug dealing in three different types: a house, the street, and the domiciliary. For 
each type, we describe the classes of drugs offered, the relation of storage and distribution, 
and how the exchanges take place. In addition, we argue that dealers have no incentives to 
integrate, neither vertically nor horizontally since a variety of independent dealers is better 
for the market than one immense criminal organization. 
  
The first category is the house dealer. In this type of exchange, individuals use houses for 
the storage and distribution of illegal drugs. For our study, house dealers belong to a 
completely fixed type of exchange. Most likely, the place used as distribution point is the 
dealer's personal residence, which is commonly located in areas of centralized crime. 
House dealers offer crack, marijuana and cocaine. By supplying the three classes of drugs, 
they reduce average costs. In terms of production, the house should not be accounted as a 
direct cost. In most cases, the dealer is the head of the family living in the house. Other 
family members may be involved in any of the productive steps of the exchange, from 
weighing and packing to selling. The interviewed dealers reported that the younger children 
are located on the corners of the streets near the house, awaiting potential clients. Their 
task is to indicate where the narcotics can be purchased; they serve as promoters of the 
drugs. 
Clients typically buy a few grams of drugs for personal consumption, which gives low profit 
margins14. Moreover, there is no implementation of price discrimination mechanisms. On 
the contrary, dealers exchange with any person that comes to the house to buy, without 
any requirement of previous association. They do not have specific working hours, but are 
available at any time, day or night. As a result, house dealing is accessed by a wide range 
of buyers, and the fidelity of the clients is limited. For this reason, fixed dealing benefits are 
sustained by the collection small exchanges with multiple (unrelated) costumers more than 
by repeated interactions with the same clients. 
Street dealing comprises the second category of supply. These dealers do not work in 
groups or with their families, but take selling drugs to the streets. They are individuals who 
simultaneously balance drug dealing with a legal job, in most cases informal15, which is the 
main source of income for many citizens. These types of jobs generally do not belong to a 
specific location, but take place on the streets of the cities (i.e., individuals who walk around 
the city selling candies, cigarettes and snacks). Street dealers use their legal front to 
increase their income and as a shield to distribute drugs. Another way of street dealing 
                                                
14 The possibility of storing great quantities of drugs makes house dealing a potentially higher intermediary supplying for 
other final sellers. However, this is not a common practice for the greater level of organization it requires and the higher 
levels of risk involved, for a familiar business. 
15 Colombia is a country with a high level of informal economies. Mondragón-Velez, Peña and Wills (2010) studies the 
characteristics of informal economies in Colombia. In addition, Guataquí, García-Suaza and Rodríguez-Acosta (2011) 
shows that in 2010 the rate of informality in Bucaramanga was 63.43%. 
  
occurs inside discotheques and bars. The strong relationship between drug users and 
nightlife makes bars and discotheques places where drugs are in high demand. Street 
dealers are exposed to encounters with the police while walking in the city or locating 
themselves in public places. The legal job serves as a distribution mechanism, but not as 
the storage point. Therefore, they cannot carry great amounts of drugs. Street dealers keep 
most of their supplies in an independent and hidden storage place, a stash, and carry 
enough drugs to supply various clients. However, the available supplies are much lower 
than in house dealing. Whenever they ran out of drugs to sell, dealers return to their stash, 
take out more, and go back to the selling point. As a consequence, the street dealer 
partially unlinks storage from the distribution point, and we classify it as a semi-fixed type of 
exchange. Street dealers offer the three classes of drugs, as well. 
Street dealers actively look for clients and complement their profits with the income from 
their legal jobs. They maintain the same condition, as in fixed dealing, of exchanging with 
every client independently of whether they have previously met or not. This allows them to 
increase payoffs by the aggregation of small exchanges, but also decreases the expected 
fidelity of clients. However, by partially unlinking storage from distribution, they reduce the 
potential risk of capture compared to house dealing, given they gain mobility. Additionally, 
they decrease the size of a potential punishment in the case of being captured, for they 
carry smaller amounts of drugs. In summary, the street dealer intends simultaneously to 
diversify her products in order to increase her income, and to disconnect most of the 
storage from the distribution in order to avoid higher potential punishments in the event of 
being captured. 
The third category is the domiciliary. This dealer delivers the drugs directly to the users' 
preferred location (i.e., her house or office). This exchange emerged from the increased 
accessibility of mobile communication, and is characterized by dealers who are contacted 
by their clients via cell phone. By default, it is generalized as being related to an informal 
activity: the supply of street cell phone communication16. In this sense, mobile 
                                                
16 The interviews allowed us to recreate the “history of mobile drug dealing in Colombia”. The domiciliary exchange 
started at first using beepers or pagers, which provided a communication service using text messages. However, its use 
was not frequent because the procedure required an intermediary: the operator from the company offering the paging 
service. This scenario experienced a dramatic change since 1994, when the cellular phone communication came to 
Colombia. The elimination of any intermediaries made very popular to contact drug dealers to their mobile phones. In 
  
communication and its increasing informal supply opened the way for a new type of drug 
exchange that started in the nineties: domiciliary drug dealing. 
Through a cell phone call the client contacts her dealer, specifies the class and amount of 
drugs she wants, and sets a meeting place; which can be different for each encounter. 
Dealers normally store the drug supplies at their house. After receiving a call, they go to the 
storage point and pick up only the amount of drugs requested by the client. The mode of 
transportation used by domiciliary dealers in Bucaramanga for their deliveries is a 
motorcycle, which allows them to easily return to their stash every time they get a new call. 
In this order of ideas, this exchange is characterized by fully detaching the storage of drugs 
from the distribution, and the distribution from a pre-established and fixed geographic point. 
Thus, we denote it as a mobile exchange. 
Domiciliary dealers also work 24 hours a day. However, there are three main 
characteristics that differentiate mobile exchange from the fixed and semi-fixed ways of 
dealing. First, it is characterized by selling drugs only to previously acquainted customers. 
An existing client must introduce every new customer. This increases the expected fidelity 
of clients and guarantees an increase in their margin of profit through repeated interactions 
with existing clients rather than by multiple small exchanges with one-time consumers. As 
mentioned before, the type of clientele using this service are businessmen, medical 
doctors, or people who want to avoid any suspicion when the dealer comes to their office or 
home to deliver the drugs. Second, domiciliary dealers follow a sort of dress code. Unlike 
house or street dealers that merge better in concentrated areas of crime by dressing 
informally, the domiciliary avoids drawing attention or suspicion by carefully choosing their 
appearance and clothes. Third, dealers tend to specialize in the distribution of cocaine. The 
domiciliary does not sell crack because it is not profitable given the relation of price to unit 
of weight; every gram of crack is worth a tenth of the price of cocaine. They also do not sell 
marijuana because of the relation of price per unit of volume, that is to say, the space 
needed to hide marijuana in the delivery is much higher given the price it is worth; 
                                                                                                                                                             
addition, a complementary phenomenon of informal activities, the street supply of cellphone calls reinforced this modality 
of drug exchange. Individuals stand on the corners in commercial areas, selling phone calls at low rates. The emergence 
of informal cellphone communication caused a peculiar calling pattern, not only to contact drug dealers. People receive 
calls with their own mobile phones, but make calls by using the street suppliers, due to the fact that calls made through 
informal providers cost less than calling plans offered by the phone companies. The informal supply turned into the way to 
leave false records, for no client needed to use her personal mobile phone to contact a dealer. 
  
compared to cocaine. Dealers reported that to sell marijuana it would be necessary to 
exchange greater amounts. Yet, individual consumers are not interested in purchasing big 
quantities.  
As a result, the technological advancement of cell phone communication has widened the 
possibilities to avoid police action and to reduce the transaction costs. One call between 
previously known clients and dealers is all it bring to simplify the process. In contrast to this, 
fixed dealers are those who use traditional technology. These dealers continue inside the 
market either because they are not completely specialized and offer the three classes of 
drugs, or because they do not compete directly with the segment of the market covered by 
the domiciliary. The house dealer stores and offers the three classes of drugs, and the 
street dealer does not have a captive-market, but simply locates herself in a point in the city 
where it becomes easy for the potential customers to find her. Mobile exchanges, on the 
other hand, combine specializing in the high-income segment of the market with flexible 
organization, which is more difficult for the police to control. This combination leads to a 
higher margin of profit in comparison to the other two types of exchange, as reported by the 
mobile dealers interviewed. 
 
4.3 Media analysis of drug dealing 
We now complement the description of drug dealing types based on the interviews, with the 
criminal data published in Vanguardia Liberal. For this, we classified arrests in four groups: 
no type (16%), the house (27%), the street (53%), and the domiciliary (4%). We could not 
classify some observations in any of the established categories, given that the information 
was not homogeneous. When an arrest was reported in a building, located by its address, 
we classified it as a house dealer. In the same way, other observations specified the name 
of the street where the arrest occurred, usually pointing to a precise location. We classified 
these as street dealers. Finally, we classified as domiciliary the arrests for which the 
newspaper made an explicit reference and used domiciliary as the category, or when it 
referred to people transporting the drugs using a motorcycle. 
  
Since mobile communication entered the country in 1994, the number of arrested house 
dealers has decreased, as illustrated in Figure 4. Starting in 2002, there has been a drastic 
change in street dealer arrests. The year 2004 marked the highest value of arrests in the 
series with 75 arrests. 
 
Figure 4: Arrests per type of exchange along time 
 
There is an increase in the arrests to drug dealers starting since 2002. 
 
With respect to location, it is worth highlighting that most of the street dealers were arrested 
in the center of the city17. Figure 5 observes that 77% of the total arrests take place in the 
center and the northern areas of the city (Norte, Nororiente, and San Francisco) most of the 
captures take place on the streets. These are Bucaramanga's lower socio-economic 
neighborhoods. This relates to our consideration that fixed and semi-fixed dealings are 






                                                
17 The center of Bucaramanga is illustrated by the comuna $15$ in Figure \ref{bucaramanga}. The other areas are Norte: 
1, Nororiente: 2, San Francisco: 3, Oriente: 13, Concordia: 6, Cabecera: 12, Sur: 11 and Ciudadela: 7. 
  
 
Figure 5: Location of the arrests per type of exchange 
 
Most arrests of fixed and semi-fixed dealers take place in areas of low socio-economic 
stratification. 
 
In summary, the drug dealing market in the city of Bucaramanga does not consist of big 
organizations; each dealer can be considered a one-person firm. This fact can be explained 
by the illegal characteristics of the business, and leads to the observation that each dealer 
has very small market power. This market structure bests serves the interests of both the 
consumer and the dealer, as they jointly aim to avoid police surveillance. 
 
5. The role of the police 
The police are in charged of monitoring, tracking, capturing and taking to justice anyone 
who commits a crime. Therefore, each police agent has the obligation of forcing dealers 
and consumers to obey the laws that they choose to break. In this section, we explain the 
strategies police agents employ in this context. A police agent, as perceived in our 
research, has two duties. First, they decide on the amount of effort invested into the 
surveillance and arrest of potential and actual offenders (Becker, 1968). Second, they 
choose on the level of punishment a captured criminal receives. It is crucial to note that the 




5.1 Monitoring and capture 
Policemen have a great deal of duties. Among others, they are responsible for finding and 
bringing both drug dealers and users18 to justice. However, the mechanisms designed by 
dealers and consumers to exchange make it very difficult for the police to locate them. In 
order to combat this, police agents must obtain information to capture offenders. One 
method is to monitor by way of security cameras and patrol areas of centralized crime. 
Another source of information are neighbors who feel threatened or offended by the 
presence of addicts purchasing drugs in their neighborhood. Nevertheless, surveillance and 
information from neighbors have specific implications depending on the type of drug 
dealing. 
The fixed and semi-fixed exchanges are more likely to be observed and such dealers are 
more likely to be arrested compared to mobile dealers. Due to this fact, dealers often carry 
small amounts of drugs in their possession. This allows them to disguise as a consumer 
thus guaranteeing a much lower punishment than if processed as a dealer. The domiciliary, 
for whom storage is detached from distribution, and distribution separated from a fixed 
area, does not carry any other evidence of her job except the amount of drugs requested 
for one client. Moreover, clients meet domiciliary dealers in public places such as 
cafeterias, or in the clients' office, where the reach of the police is minimal. As reported in 
the interviews, most captures to domiciliary dealers happen given the information provided 
through parents of young drug users who find out what their children are doing. However, a 
high level of effort is required to capture this type of dealers, much more than for the other 
types. 
For a more detailed analysis of the data presented in Vanguardia Liberal, we studied the 
existing relationship between the type of dealer arrested and other available variables. We 
chose the arrests of house dealers as the dependent variable. This type of arrest is clearly 
identifiable within the data, for it occurs in a house or a building, while the other types of 
                                                
18 For the case of Colombia, drug users are also penalized. The government of Uribe Velez reformed Article 40 of the 
Constitution, and changed laws 30 of 1986 and 100 of 1993, imposing a legal punishment upon the personal dose of 
drugs. 
  
dealing, street and domiciliary, take place on the streets of the city, and the classification is 
not as apparent. 
In Table 1 we present the results of four logit models used to study the probability of being 
captured in a house. We use age and the lineal tendency (year), as explanatory variables. 
Additionally, we include the dummy variables of gender (male) and possession of weapons 
or drugs at the moment of the arrest. For regressions 3 and 4 we also included dummy 
variables for geographic location within the different sectors of Bucaramanga. The 
difference in regression 4 is the exclusion of the age variable, which allows us to study the 
entire sample. 
Table 1: Regression arrests of house dealers 
 REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 
Constant 239.602*** 142.962** 123.990* 32,599 
Year -0.121*** -0.073** -0.064* -0,018 
Age 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.040***  
Male -0,161 -0,131 -0,149 -0,209 
Possession 
Knife -1,333 -1,213 -1,156 -1,758 
Firearm 1.863*** 1.844*** 1.692** 1.540*** 
Money 0.941*** 0.717** 0.823*** 0.428* 
Cocaine  0.682* 0,58 0.580* 
Marihuana  0.467* 0.468* 0.491** 
Bazuco  1.397*** 1.407*** 1.505*** 
Location (ref. Centro) 
Norte   -0,294 -0,585 
Nororien   -0,397 0,138 
San francisco   0,152 0,48 
Oriente   1.036* 1.009** 
Concordia   0,772 1,369 
Sur   0,61 0,822 
Ciudadela   0,775 1.189*** 
Cabecera   -0,469 -0,883 
Observations 415 415 415 546 
Logit estimation.  *  p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
The year variable supports the observation that arrests of house dealers decreased over 
the years studied, as illustrated in Figure 4. This coefficient is always negative and 
significant in the first three regressions. In contrast to this, the age coefficient is positive 
and significant, which indicates that there is a higher probability that the older dealers will 
  
be house dealers. In terms of gender, there are no significant differences, although the 
negative sign for this variable suggests that the proportion of men captured in the house 
dealing type is slightly lower than in the other types of dealing. In total, 60% of the arrested 
dealers are men, while in the house dealing sample, this proportion is 49%. 
In terms of the possession of weapons at the moment of the arrest, the probability of 
carrying a firearm is greater for house dealers. In contrast, knives are more common 
amongst mobile dealers. The coefficient of the knives dummy variable is always negative 
and not significant, while the coefficient for the firearm dummy variable is always positive 
and significant. It is also relevant to highlight the possession of drugs and money at the 
time of the arrest. It is evident that the higher the amount of drugs found, the higher the 
potentially legal punishment for the arrested dealer. We observe that coefficients related to 
money and drugs are always positive and significant. The only exception is the coefficient 
of possession of cocaine in regression 3. In this order of ideas, we confirm that house 
dealers sell all three classes of drugs, and in the case of arrest, the probability that the 
police find evidence of their crime is higher than street or domiciliary dealers. 
Finally, we used the center of the city as reference point to analyze the geographic location 
of the arrests. The highest number of arrests is focused in the city's center. From this, we 
conclude that the proportion of house dealers in comparison to the other two types of 
exchange is comparable in all other sectors of the city. This is supported by the non-
significance of the coefficients. In the entire sample, 27% of the arrests pertain to house 
dealers, and this percentage trend would continue even if the sample were divided by 
sectors. The oriente and ciudadela sectors are an exception, for they have a positive and 
significant coefficient. We can infer that the higher proportion of arrests in these residential 
areas is due to information provided by neighbors who negatively perceive drug users and 
dealers. 
 
5.2 The punishment 
In addition to the level of effort invested into surveillance and capture of criminals, police 
agents have another decision to make: the level of punishment applied to a captured 
  
criminal. On one hand, and being completely legitimate, the police agent has to bring the 
arrested individual to the police station in order to start the legal process against her. 
However, in some cases, the choice made is different and police agents punish offenders 
according to their personal criteria. 
Dealers have informed of cases in which a police agent punished them using physical 
aggressions. These aggressions were never strong enough to leave a blemish, which could 
be used against them afterwards; its sole purpose was to intimidate and deter the 
delinquents from participating in drug exchanges again. In other cases, the punishment 
was monetary. Police agents kept the money and the drugs from the arrested dealer or 
consumer, and released them. Another punishment is the threat of reporting a greater 
amount of drugs than what captured dealers or consumers actually had. Given that police 
agents keep in their possession the drugs from previous arrests, they threaten to add those 
substances to the list of possessions found at the time of arrest. This implies a significant 
difference in the legal punishment that the dealer or the consumer could receive. Dealers 
informed that in most cases these deviations from the legal punishment were used when 
the arrested individuals behaved aggressively against the police agents who captured 
them. Other police operations aimed to capture various types of criminals can lead to the 
finding of drug dealers as an indirect result. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that 
arresting a single drug dealer is not profitable since the costs to search, capture, and 
penalize the dealer are much higher than the value of such an arrest for society. Moreover, 
the impression that drug dealers provided in the interviews is that they do not feel 
persecuted or surveyed. They believe that with a low effort of discretion it is possible to 
elude most police activity. 
In summary, police action attempts to deter criminals and to capture those who are not 
deterred. In response to prohibition, criminals aim to avoid the police activity. At the drug 
dealing level, it is usually more profitable to hide, by keeping a low profile, than trying to 
negotiate with the authorities; leading to a reduction in the incentives of dealers to organize 





6. Final Remarks 
This research develops a description of the market of illegal drugs sold to the final 
consumer in the city of Bucaramanga (Colombia). Drug users in the city are not 
homogeneous. On the individual level, the consumer must choose which drug to buy and 
look for a dealer accordingly. The choice is made between crack, marijuana and cocaine, 
and it is possible to state that their idiosyncratic characteristics determine different 
segments of the market. Beggars or street inhabitants will look for a more fixed type of 
exchange, such as a house dealer, due to budget constraints. Individuals with a higher 
level of income will choose to have cocaine delivered, given this type of dealing is more 
comfortable and less risky. 
The problem of deterrence is central, given that the police impose most of the costs for the 
individuals who attempt to exchange drugs. Nevertheless, the law serves merely as a 
frame of reference to assess the payoffs and not as an unbreakable condition. This is a 
crucial element in terms of contracts because the illegal exchange implies that the parts 
involved need to generate informal mechanisms to bring the agreements into compliance.  
It is not profitable for dealers to consolidate one big firm of drug exchange. The state of uni-
personal firms reduces visibility from the police and diminishes the incentives of the State 
to invest a higher level of resources to capture them. As a result, drug dealing businesses 
in Bucaramanga present low revenue margins. These margins are complemented by 
selling to all potential clients in fixed exchanges, by the revenues of the informal legal jobs 
in the semi-fixed exchanges, and by specializing in the exchanges of cocaine to previously 
known clients in mobile dealings. 
In conclusion, we observe that both consumers and dealers attempt to avoid being 
exposed to the action of the police. Our main finding is that the drug dealing market is lead 
to complete vertical and horizontal disintegration, instead of directly confronting authorities. 
A fundamental cause for this is the low-price context of drugs, due to the fact that Colombia 
  
is a producing country. Further intended research will observe the relation between the 
drug dealing market in producing countries with the phenomenon of drug tourism. Drug 
tourists are consumers who travel to countries where drugs are either produced (i.e. 
Colombia, Bolivia, Mexico) or legal (i.e. The Netherlands, Canada), to obtain higher levels 
of quality for lower prices. 
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